Bangor Public Library

Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl
World War Regimental Histories

World War Collections

1945

The trail of 254 thru blood & fire
Harris Peel
United States Army

Follow this and additional works at: http://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/ww_reg_his
Recommended Citation
Peel, Harris and United States Army, "The trail of 254 thru blood & fire" (1945). World War Regimental Histories. 46.
http://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/ww_reg_his/46

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the World War Collections at Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl. It has been
accepted for inclusion in World War Regimental Histories by an authorized administrator of Bangor Community: Digital Commons@bpl. For more
information, please contact ccoombs@bpl.lib.me.us.

D I

~

I S I

<> .N

/\

'

-··

·------ ..:...,.._ -~

z54t&!NFANTRY
JOSEPH H.WARREH. ~
coMMANDING OFFICER

MARION W.SCHEWE.JttMnd
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

ROBERT E.TUCKER,.(t.Cofotut
COMMANDING OFFICER lUBN.
WILLIAM J.BRYAN.(t.&~
COMMANDING OFFICER 21?BN.

DONALD R.MATHESON .(f.fotmut
COMMANDING OFFICER 31?BN.
?$@§

/

A 1Anit IJiJiory
Dedicated to every man who wad ever addigned to our unit. 'But above aLL it id dedicated
to thode who feLl on the Long road to victory.
Jt id with the hope that thede men will be remanbered, not for the war in which they foughf, but for
a new, Ladting peace for which they died that thid
book recountd the hidiory of the 254th Jnfantry.

7his is the story of one regiment; or rather, it is the story of
~the men of one regiment. Undoubtedly, the world took little
note of the 254th Infantry. To them we were merely a number,
a small unit which lost itself in a multitude of small units, a forgotten integer in headlines which screamed only of corps and
armies and theaters of war.
But to those of us who fought in the regiment, it was the army,
the theater, the war. When our casualties were high, the war
was a tough one; when we moved rapidly and the land fell to
us like wheat before a reaper, the war was going well.
Our regiment has one hundred and twenty five days of combat
to its credit. Each of these days could be a saga in itself. Because of both time and space limitations, it has been necessary
to deal only with the most important engagements - for the most
part, those in which the entire regiment participated.
There are no names in this history. In our records there are
countless cases of individual acts of heroism. We know that there
are countless others of which we have no record. In the last
analysis, no man is more gallant than he who despite a heart
gripped with fear remained to do the task that was asked of him.
As this book goes to press, there are only a few of those left
who helped make the 254th a regiment of which we could be so
proud. We hope that as you read this book it will bring back,
in some measure, the days we-the regiment and you-spent
together.

Chapte•• 1

O

ne chapter in the lives of each of us is now complete. That
episode, whether it marks a prominent or a lowly place in
our life's story, will be entitled by all "The 254th Infantry Regiment." For a few, it began on the northern bank of the Danube
River just as we were being pulled off the front line for the last
time ; for another few, it began on the day of activation at Camp
Blanding, Florida; for the majority of us there was a place, a time
somewhere between.
In the early part of 1943, slightly a year after the United States
had declared war on Germany, the three great leaders of the
anti-fascist nations gave birth to plans at the Casablanca Conference for the defeat of the Nazi cancer which was gnawing at
the democratic organs of the world. Unknowingly, as these men
released their famous promise to make our enemies "Bleed and
burn in expiation of their crimes against humanity," they inspired
the conception of a new United States Division to be known as
the " Blood and Fire" 63d Infantry Division .
June 15, 1943, was a hot, sultry day at Camp Blanding, Florida, as
the entire contingent of men assigned to the 254th Infantry Regiment from the 390th Infantry, 98th
Infantry Division listened to their
commander, Brigadier General
Louis E. Hibbs, promise that the
new division would someday see
combat. At this time the unit consisted of 139 officers and 276
enlisted men commanded by
Colonel Paul T. Baker, who had
as his Executive Officer the man
who was later designated to lead
the 254th Infantry into combat,
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H.
Warren.

fhe first two months following the activation of the regiment
- were days spent in training the cadre and the occasional "fillers" who merely trickled into the organization.
The first order of movement was to Camp Van Dorn, Mississipi,
· and was completed four days after its start on August 21, 1943.
Men began to pour into the unit from reception centers all over
the country as an intensive training schedule commenced . These
were the days of life in tar P,aper shacks, lectures on our favorite maneuver, "Build up a base of fire, flank to the right or left,"
of pine sloped hills resounding with the noise of shovels in
sandy clay and men's laughter, of week-end trips to Baton
Rouge with their inevitable mile long bus line, of double chocolate sundaes atop bottles of 3.2 beer, of K. P. for the lower
brackets and c.· 0. for the upper brackets, of hurried furloughs
that never lasted long enough, of Saturday parades which always
made us too hot or too cold, of cooling showers which we
dreamed of through the 5, 10, or 25 miles of dust and sweat and
tired feet, of welcome cries of "Take ten!" accompan ied by the
sound of a hundred matches striking, of two day bivouacs in the
rain under a leaky shelter half, and of squad runs, squad runs,
and more squad runs .
But all was not as carefree as the above paragraph may sound .
It seemed as if the Regiment was plagued with bad luck. Everytime a group of men felt as if they had trained together long
enough to make a good combat team a new Special Order called
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for all Pte's and Privates, and many times a good portion of the
non-coms. Three times the regiment was built to full fighting
strength; three times it was broken.
Around August 1, 1944, came the order that we had so long
awaited, some of us anxiously, some of us apathetically, and some
of us dreadingly: the alert for overseas movement. The great
exodus for the train station at McComb began as mass furloughs
were granted. After our hectic ten days at home, wives, mothers,
and sweethearts were left in tears at the station as we departed
with the "this is it" attitude.
Dame Rumor became the new Commanding Officer as each
barracks had its quota of those who either "got it straight from
a guy who practically runs division personnel" or "was just down
at S-1 when this phone call comes in, see." Around November
1st, when it was a certainty that we were leaving very soon, the
camp was divided into two almost equal groups: those who
knew we were going to Fort Ord, California, and those who
were positive it would be Camp Kilmer, "Joisy." After standing an average of three show-down inspections each day, at
each of which someone managed to lose a shoe string, we boarded the train on November 6, 1944. Here most of us learned for
the first time that we were headed for Camp Shanks, New York.
Several thousand dollars worth of bets were cancelled between
the "Ord" and "Kilmer" men.
Three days later we detrained at our destination. The race began immediately to make our unit qualified for POE. The world
became one of seemingly endless inspections, life-boat drill,
must movies, and last minute range firing. Throughout all of this
we had only one primary thought, passes. Many of us lived within
commuting distance of New York City and a portion of our eighteen hours was spent in traveling between our homes and Grand
Central Station. Some of us had managed to have our wives stay
in the City while we remained at this camp. For the rest of us
there was an endless pilgrimage from one bar to another, from
one night spot to the next, from show to show with 'occasional
stops at the Pepsi Cola bar for refreshment prior to another attempt to call home from the Serviceman's Telephone Exchange.
Two weeks after our arrival at Camp Shanks, we left, carrying
our duffel bags loaded with complete Gl equipment and a per-
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sonal horde of cigarettes and chocolate bars. A short ride brought
us to the Brooklyn Army Base, New York Port of Embarkation.
While on the dock we stuffed ourselves with doughnuts and
coffee which were served us by the American Red Cross and
managed to find somewhere among our baggage a place to put
the gift bag we received.
As we climbed the gangplank and entered the boat each man
was shown his stateroom, which consisted of one canvas bunk
in a room with two hundred other canvas bunks . For most of us
it was our first ocean voyage and the adventure of being at sea
helped displace the feeling of homesickness . Our first curiosity,
that which concerned our boat and its history, was soon satisfied. We found that we were on the "M. S Saturnia," a former
Italian luxury liner which had surrendered , to the British with its
entire crew. We walked down to the bowels of the ship to pe_er
at the huge Diesel engine which we w·ere told was the largest
afloat.
The sea was fairly calm and the voyage was rather a pleasant
one. A limited program of calisthenics and training combined
with an extensive entertainment schedule supplemented the
many card games we played and
the books we read. The regimental
orchestra
gave
daily
shows on the aft deck. It didn't
take us long to catch the seaman's slang and in two days all
directions were given by port,
aft, for' d , bow, and stern. The
theme song of each show was
" I Lost My Chow On the Bow."
Late mornings, late afternoons,
and late evenings saw the rails
lined with men viewing the awe
inspiring scene of tumultuous
green
waves
dashing
themselves against the other ships of
the convoy silhouetted against
the dark blue sky. Early mornings,
afternoons, and evenings, just
after mess, the rails were also
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crowded with men viewing the awful scene of tumuituous gre~l"\
waves dashing themselves against the green ships of the convoy
silhouetted against a green sky in a green world . The nights were
ever heralded by the raucous voice of one of the Italian crew
members announcing over the loud speaker system, "Atenshione,
atenshione, light showing starboards, ameed sheeps. "
Undoubtedly, the most beautiful scene of the entire trip was
the night of December 6th when we passed through the Straits of
Gibraltar. To our left we could see a few lights blinking on ,:The
Rock" itself and the shadow it made from the light of the full
moon; to our right it seemed as if the entire coastline of Northern
Africa was a blaze of lights as our ship scurried through the mined
waters.
On December 8th, we entered the harbor of one of the most
beautiful of all port cities - - Marseilles. In the harbor we could
see the famous Chateau D'lf while our ship nervously plied its
way through the fifty ships which had been scuttled in the harbor
by the Germans.
The following day we disembarked and marched through th'e
streets of Marseilles to await transportation to whatever destination was in store for us . Although the town, particularly the water
front, had ' been heavily bombed and shelled th.e city was in good
enough shape to see its rare beauty. We marched to an assembly
point which was just outside the prisoner of war enclosure. Here,
for the first time, most of us saw caged copies of those we later
fought.
As darkness fell we began to feel the extreme cold which an
icy wind blowing from the north brought with it. By the time the
trucks finally arrived to take us to Staging Area Number 2, Delta
Base Section, most of us were willing to label as malevolant propaganda the stories we had heard concerning the "sunny Mediterranean climate." As we began our 20 mile march for our first
overseas location, we wondered if combat could possibly be as
dangerous and miserable as the truck ride at unbelievable speeds
along the icy mountain roads which curved toward our new destination. No matter how cynical had been our expectation of what
to expect at Staging Area Number 2, all of us were disappointed .
We found that the installation which bore the splendiferous name
was nothing more than a bald clay hill with one kitchen shack
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along the main road approximately every one hundred
Directly behind them at a distance of about five hundred
was a similar row of latrines; the space between these two
of huts was designated as our living quarters. Here we

yards.
yards
types
sump-

tuously pitched our tents.
Although no passes were formally given to any of the members
of the regiment, it took no time at all for everyone to learn that
Mars.eilles and its surrounding towns were within easy hitch-hiking
distance . Here on passes most of us met our first real French women,
drank our first French champagne, and gave our first cigarettes
and chocolate in answer to the pleading children with their "Cigarettes pour papa; chocolate pour babe?" We were amazed to
find that a package of cigarettes would buy almost anything that
the .average one of us wanted .
The first defensive action in which the regiment engaged was
caused by a lone German observation plane which flew over our
camp about three days after our arrival. In a matter of seconds •
all of the hundreds of fires which dotted our hill were extinguished and men who had always somehow gotten out of digging
foxholes while in the States began to frantically make a personal
entrenchment.
Our stay at Delta Base section was not a long one and we left
there on December 16 with Camp Oberhoffen, near Bischweiller,
France, as our destination . We were taken by trucks toward a
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small railway station ciose to the staging area. As we began to
leave the trucks some of the more observant men noticed the fa mous "40 and 8" railroad box cars. They pointed them o•Jt as the
quaint conveyances upon which our fathers had ridden in the last
world war. Originally designed around 1900, they were supposed
to hold 40 men and 8 horses. All of us laughed and wondered
how either 8 horses or 40 men could be put in these tiny, ridiculous looking vehicles. We were not laughing nearly so hard a few
minutes later when we learned that we were going to take a four
day trip in these cars. Twenty-five men in each made for slightly
crowded conditions, but it ·increased the much needed warmth
considerably, there being no method of heating the boxcar.
Amazingly, we found that the trip was much more enjoyable than
we would ever have anticipated. The large sliding doors made it
possible for almost everyone to see the country through which we
were traveling. Numerous stops made it ~imple to attain bottles
of champagne in exchange for a pack or two of cigarettes. The
most notable towns we passed through were Lyon, Dijon, Epinal,
and Saarburg. Throughout France we found , however, that many
buildings, factories, roads, and bridges were destroyed beyond
any chance of repair or salvage. This gave us our first sight
of the true effects of war and many of us vowed that the Germans
would
pay
for
the
destruction they had so wantonly
wrought throughout the country
of this almost prostrate ally of
ours. We reached Camp Oberhoffen on December 20th after
a truck ride from Saarburg,
where the railroad ended. Oberhoffen, which translated in English means "Always Hope," was
an old Napoleanic cavalry camp
which had been used by both
the French and Germans, in various stages of history, for over
200 years.
When we first heard that Camp
Oberhoffen
had
been
taken
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only six days before our arrival we felt almost like veterans.
At this time we were part of Task Force Harris, which consisted
of three Infantry Regiments of the 63d Division and a Division
Headquarters detachment. The first field order which was issued
ordered us to duty with the 7th Army, and prepared us for
early patrolling of the Rhine River near Strasbourg, France. Our
first alert was given in the form of a message from G-2 at 2215
on December 23, 1944. It read, "Be on the alert for enemy paratroopers. Number dropped during recent alert between 2100 and
2130. Paratroopers probably in American uniform . Be careful of
future drops during night." Although several of us while standing guard imagined the silky white umbrella shaped objects
falling toward us in the moonless night, there was never any
great reason to suspect that parachutists were dropped in our
area .
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December 24th came and went as most every other day, with
a full training schedule; only the quietness of all those around
us reminded us that it was Christmas Eve. The following day,
after a delicious turkey dinner, we received our second mail
call since being overseas. This, combined with a post exchange
ration, boosted our morale from its probable lowest ebb.
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The orders for our attachment to another unit came on December 28th, announcing that effective the 27th, the 254th Infantry was attached to the 3d Infantry Division, First French
Army, VI Army Group for active duty.

n

The next day the movement began toward the area which
surrounds Ville, France. Just a trifle over a year and a half after
the regiment had been activated, it was moving toward the
mission it had always known that it would someday fulfill combat with the enemy on his own ground .

\1,

a1

A
tc
ta
a1

th
th

0
0

Tl

L<
t~

ur
it
a1

N

m
a1

ir

-8 -

Chapter Il

••

0

n the first day of the first month of 1945, the free people of
the world together prayed that this year might end the great
slaughter of the war in Europe . For them it was a new dawn of
hope, of faith, and of rededication to the task that lay before
them .
For the 254th Infantry, too, January the first was a day different
from all others : for most of us it was our first day of combat.
We did not go into battle as a regiment, but rather as battalions
and companies attached to units of our foster parent, the Th i rd
Infantry Division . Whether we were in the group attached to the
30th Infantry in the vicinity of Kaysersberg (our First Battalion,
Antitank Company, and I & R Platoon), or in the group attached
to the 7th Infantry in the vicinity of Lapoutrois (our Second Battalion with Service and Cannon Companies) , or in the group
attached to the 15th Infantry in the vicinity of Bergheim (our
Third Battalion and Regimental Headquarters) , all of us had much
the ,same reaction as we moved toward the front line t o relieve
tho se on the defensive.
Many of us we re a5similating what we had been told about
our mission. We were about to be engaged in one of the most
o i tter campaigns of the entire War in Europe : the Colmar Pocket.
The First French Army, under the command of General d ' A rmee
Laitre d 'Tassigney, had compressed the enemy in that part of
the Vosges Mountains surrounding the French city of Colmar
until the Ge rman lines had become a virtual ring of steel e ngulfing
it, the adjacent towns, the juncture of the Rhine-Rhone Canal,
and all that territory east to the Rhine River. At this time, the
Nazis were emplaced in all the most strateg ic positions this
mountain studded region afforded ; in addition to thi s, they had
ample supplies of men and materiel , including much armor, to
indefini tely hold this gro und .

'
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At twilight we began our march
toward the front in order to effect
our assigned relief under the
cover of darkness; involuntarily
the pace quickened as if our feet
were attempting to keep step
with our fast beating hearts , We
were three thousand; our thoughts
were a million_ Homes, families,
wives, conversations, books, feet,
and guns ran through our minds
singly or simultaneously, While
one of us thought of his wife,
another recalled a passage from
All Quiet on the Western Front.
Yet each of us had two things in
common: a question and a certitude_ We wondered how we would
react in combat; we knew we were scared .
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An old sol<;fier would have recognized us instantly as what we
were: a fresh, green outfit "going up" for the first time. But a
veteran wou)d not have laughed at us just as later we never
laughed at the uninitiated. We were about to learn something that
each man must experience for himself. Combat defies description.
No man can impart to another what it is really like.
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Slowly 'the light ebbed until there was only the dark and the
cold and a fragment of a moon_ We talked in whispers as our
stomachs began to feel like bottomless pits mounted on legs of
rubber. • Occasionally someone would attempt a joke such as
"Man, my foxhole' s gonna be so damn deep they ' ll have to gimme
a campaign ribbon for the CBI !" These were met either by silence
punctu.ated only with the sound of heavy boots automatically rising and falling on packed snow or by low, mirthless laughter
which lasted too long .
We watched, our eyes hypnotized, as for the first time we saw
in the distance the reddish burst of flame as big guns sent hundreds of pounds of explosive into the night, the blinding flash of
phosphorus with its flaming fingers probing skyward, the dazzling
light of flares which hung in the sky for a few moments lighting a
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havoc-wrought, seemingly deserted world, the arched fall of machine gun tracers looking like red rain blown by a driving wind .
Sounds - new sounds - assailed our ears, adding to this, our
first vision of men engaged in mutual destruction. There was the
constant, patterned monotony of heavy shells rocking the air at
exact intervals, wearing themselves out as the echo bounced from
hill to hill; the hissing of high velocity shells ending in a sharp
report; the fantastic screech of "Screeming Meemies" that made
us instinctively want to lay on the ground and dig a hole. This we
saw and heard and felt, and as it filtered through three thousand
minds there came to each of us a different impression.
That night a thousand questions were answered and a thousand
more raised . We discovered how men lived at the front. Command
Posts were placed in cellars of destructed buildings and those of
us on line spent our first night in a foxhole. A shell would scream
overhead and we would fall to the ground hugging the earth as
if she were our lover. A lifetime would pass until the shell crashed harmlessly hundreds of yards away.
Then slowly we would rise, dust the snow from our clothes, and
grin sheepishly at our comrades who were also grinning sheepishly. This continued until, as a last resort to maintain self-respect,
we paid no att-ention to the shells. Soon one would hit fairly close
and the whole process would repeat itself again.
We found that nights on the front are filled with strange noises
and that no man can trust his eyes. We watched as the first patrol
left our lines to seek contact with
the enemy; for hours we strained
our senses trying to make them
out as they returned. Every sound
seemed man-made; a twig cracking was an enemy infiltrating. We
punished our eyes until the distant trees began to pass . ammunition to each other, the ruins of
buildings moved forward on tank
treads, and the concertina wires
crawled up with machine guns.
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" As d ifferent as d ay and night " beca me a gross actuality. We
found that life during the daylight hours was simple, almost pleasant. Most of us lived in cellars which, although crowded, were
warm and could be made livable by t he addition of articles salvaged from ruined houses. Canned fruits, vegetables, and even
meat left by the inhabitants greatly augmented our " 10-in-1 " or
" C" rations . We were in the heart of the wine country and each
cellar had its huge casks and bottle racks filled with old and new
Rhine Wine . Only the outposts were manned . For those not on
duty there was little to do except eat and sleep .
At night we fought the war. From twilight until afte r dawn we
lived in a world of death, destruction, and danger. The night was
filled with explosives and flares and magnified sounds. We sent
patrols to infiltrate the enemy lines; the Germans sent patrols to
enter ours. It became a. gambl ing game with life and death as
the stake. We saw men die and we realized how thin was the
thread on which our lives dangled .
And cont inually we lea rn ed. We could different iate b ~ tween an
88 and a 76. We knew when to hit the ground and when it was unnecessary. We discovered when to lie still and when· to move .
We could ascertain between the enemy 's machine gun and ours,
his rifle and ours, his tank engine and ours . We could tell our
own patrols from his. (Ours made more noise .) We found that
our enemy was sma rt and that he had good equ ipment. In short,
we were becoming veteran s.
Not all of our time, however,
wa s spent on the line . After a
week or ten days at the front
we were given two or three days
rest in one of the shell -scarred
towns several miles to the rear.
It was here that we first discove red th e "Goums," or French
Moroccan soldiers . These characters, looking like the background in a story from the pages
of " Arabian Nights," were the
most
ferocious
fighters
and
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childish men most of us had ever met. One of the most valuable
possessions of these long-robed soldiers was a fla shlight . Only
batteries exceeded these instruments in desirability as the torlunate owners of both walked in front of their pack mules testing
the light every few moments by shining it in their eyes. After
making sure it worked they would grin broadly, showing rows of
milk white teeth, and shout the only English expression they knew,
"0. K., Joe!"
During these rest periods, too, we learned much from the veterans of the Third Division. They never seemed to mind taking time
to tell us about something we wished to know. If we became
seasoned fighters in less time than the average regiment, it was
probably due to the interest taken in us by this organization .
We were sent from one sector to another to g ive us as much
variety of experience as possible . It was also during this period
that we received a pamphlet sent to "Blood and Fire" by the
Germans . (see next page) The receipt of this filled us with wrath.
If the Germans had known the effect of their propaganda, they
would probably have saved the effort.

HKLL 216
At last, after three weeks of mastering the defensive arts, we
were assigned an offensive mission - we were to take Hill 216.
Field Order Number 1, issued on January 20, 1945, indicated the
plans of the Regimental Commander for the seizure of this well
defended knoll . The First Battalion was designated assault element
and assigned a thousand yard front extending from a point south
of Mitt,elwihr, eastward from the easterly power line. The battalion, two companies in a line, was to push forward to the north
bank of the Weiss River and establish defensive positions from
the junction of this stream and the power line eastward to the Fecht
River and thence northward to the highway bridge. An outpost
line was to be pushed forward from the Weiss River to a distance
of some thousand yards south of the main disposition while the
bridge was to be secured by not less than one platoon.
During this action, the Second Battalion was to continue to
hold its defensive position facing eastward along the Fecht River.
The Third Battalion was to stand by in regimental reserve, although

- 13 -

__.

·· ~

··-~·~

· pa~epledaJ
lx\OU
aJe
uaw 11\f · ~z AJenuec
UO
11a4S
1a1~12a1
Aq
paA!a:>aJ 1a14dwed S!lll

Company L was assigned the mission of patroii ing and outposting to the front upon the attainment of the Weiss River line.
Two days before the attack was to be made the First and
Third Battalions were released from their defensive positions
and brought to rear areas west of Mittelwihr for training . Here
those of us in these two units were briefed on the task which
awaited us. We found on the map that Hill 216 is located southwest of the Alsatian town of Bennwihr about four miles north of
Colmar. We knew (some from having been on the line in that
vicinity) that there were strongly prepared positions on the
flanks of the hill and a reinforced defensive arc running generally parallel to the Bennwihr-lngersheim Road.
Although there was some tension as the time for the attack
drew nearer, a great deal of this was dissipated as we became
" armchair strategists." Around each map a group of us would
gather and a mild discussion would begin; soon, however, fists
would pound the table as each of us realized that the rest
of those present had no understanding of what really should be
done. The endangering of the flan k in our planned zone of advance by the powerfully held German stronghold of Chateau de
Schoppenwihr became the major argument. Those who believed
the attack of the 7th Infantry in their zone would command the
attention of the defenders disputed with the more pessimistic of
us. All preferred to forget that twice the hill had been unsuccesfully attacked by other units.
During the early morning hours of January 23rd the First Battalion
(less C Company in reserve) marched f rom the assembly area
near Beblenheim to the line of departure. It was still snowing
and a bitter north wind seemed to tear unhampered through
combat pants and layers of sweaters ending in field jackets.
Our new shoe-pacs were warm but uncomfortable to walk in,
even on the soft snow; nevertheless we were thankful for them.
As we wound along the narrow road to the line of departure we
looked like a "Column of hooded ghosts in our snow capes.
Company B led the column and proceeded to the eastern half
of the battalion front; A followed to the western half. At fifteen
minutes before "H" hour, 0700, the Third Division as well as the
organizational and attached artillery began firing a preparation.
We lay in the snow and watched as the big shells flashed against
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the snow clad hilL As we saw the destruction rained on whatever
was out there waiting, we remembered what the Third Division
doughs had told us, "An Infantryman may be the hero to a lot
of people, but when you're ready to shove off in the attack, the
artilleryman is the hero's hero."
Minds and bodies became tense as we awaited the signal to
move forward. We had seen some of war but always it had been
we who awaited the enemy in our defensive positions; now it

~
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was his turn to wait in a hole, ours to attack. For the Nth time
we checked the bolt on our rifle, or adjusted the weight of our
mortar ammunition, or made sure our K-rations were properly
tied.
" OK, let's go! " Before we knew it we were moving forward,
a lot of the tenseness had left us, and we had begun our first
attack.
Silently and unseen we moved through the deep snow, our
capes blending in perfectly with the world of white which surrounded us. For a few m oments after we heard the dull explosions and saw ovr comrades· lying on the ground, we did not
realize what was happening. No shell scream, no mortar whistle
accompanied the burst. Then our minds began to work once
more and we recognized this barrier the crafty Germans had
erected a field of the tiny, foot-shearing Schu-mines. The
heavy snow fall of the preceding days coupled with brisk winds
had perfectly hidden the mines and the footprints of the soldiers
who laid them . Together the two companies began to cross the
minefield, in the only way that a minefield can be crossed - slowly, grimly, probing each step before moving, with a foot
or a leg or a life the penalty for a misstep.
The explosions of the mines alerted the waiting Germans and
mortar fire began . to pour into the minefield. This was clearly
d i rected from the top of the hill and came from weapons in the
woods south of the Weiss River. The concentration was extremely heavy and B Company began to receive large numbers of
casualties from this shelling as well as from the Schu-mines.
As the light became better, machine guns opened up from their
positions along the road at the base of Hill 216 while snipers on
the northern slope of the hill aimed their deadly fire on the men
picking their way through the mine-field.
Finally, in order to avoid a direct frontal assault on the positions
at the base of the hill, the company "gave way" to the east and
started working southward with its left flank about five hundred
yards west ol' the river. Fire came in increasing intensity from the
Chateau de Schoppenwihr and from the woods along the Fecht
River- small arms, machine guns, and 88's. Pinned down by this
curtain of fire the advance of the company after 0800 was tor-
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tuously slow. So heavy was the resistance and so high the
casualties that at 1000 it was decided to employ Company C on
the left flank .
A Company, on the battalion right flank, was making better
progress. Although many men fell from the Schu-mines, the mortar
shells consistently dropped behind the advancing units . As the

companies neared the top of the hill, machine gun, machine
pistol, and rifle fire became devastating in its accuracy. Cou rage
in the face of superio r f ire power coupled with heavy small arms,
machine gun, and mortar fire poured into the German positions
on the north slope of the hill forced the enemy to vacate this
position. By 0900 A had reached the crest, the first platoon in the
lead, the second in echelon to the left rear, and the third following shortly behind . When the units crossed the peak they found
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enemy dug in on the south slope. Even more intense fire than
they had received from the north slope met them here as they
began again to work their way through another thickly sown
minefield . Direct fire from small arms and machine guns in the
wooded area south of the Weiss River added to the torrent of
fire which the determined Germans threw in an effort to halt the
attack. Casualties mounted as men fell from the exploding shells, the accurate small arms, and the fiendish Schu-mines.
Nevertheless, the company continued to advance and by 1230
had reached the east-west road on the southern face of Hill 216.
Between this position and the river there was an open field,
undoubtedly mined and swept by direct fire from the woods
along the Weiss River. Considerably depleted by casualties, the
company found further advan ce to be impossible ; the unit com menced digging in .
Company C, in reserve at Mittelwihr, was alerted at 1000 and
by noon the line of depa rture used by the other companies
earlier in the morning was crossed . Sniper and machine gun fire
from the Chateau and the woods below it were received almost
immediately . By the time Company C had worked down to B's
former position, the latter unit had pushed forward . A group of
· riflemen had inched toward the machine gun nests and silenced
the guns ; B was moving forward again. As they came to the eastwest road, the second platoon spread to the right to gain contact
with A while a small group f rom the first platoon, following the
edge of a vineyard, pushed toward the Weiss River. Contact was
made with A by B's Second Platoon at 1430. The other platoon
pulled to the west of the north-south road and using an abandoned enemy CP formed a defensive line facing east. The leading
element of C had not proceeded far along this road before it
met B's group returning from the river, still under small arms fire .
C, therefore, built up a defensive line east of the road facing
the Fecht River.
At about 1400 it became apparent that the now depleted First
Battalion without assistance would be unable to reach the Weiss
River before dark. The Third Battalion, therefore, was alerted and
moved out at 1650. Only two rifle companies were available to
that unit for the operation, Company L remaining in regimental
reserve. In addition, K was short one platoon which had been
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employed since early morning on the First Battalion ;s left flank
and was still pinned down by fire from the Chi'lteau. Leaving the
assembly area near Beblenheim, I and K proceeded along the
east side of the Bennwihr-lngersheim road between the two
power lines. The advance of both units was slowed down con siderably by a mine field encountered on the approach march .
Probing their way through this under continued small arms and
machine gun fire, I Company proceeded, under intense fire from
the south bank of the Weiss River, to the junction of the eastern
power line and this stream. Here, after extending eastward, the
men dug in at about 1900.
After I had cleared from in front of A, K moved out eastward
along the road. On turning south the company came under heavy
machine gun and mortar fire from below the Chateau. Cautiously
the unit crossed the minefield as the scream of shrapnel coupled
with the sharp crack of well aimed bullets made the men want to
leave the single path being probed through the mine studded
area. With the aid of well placed mortar fire, K reached the Weiss
river at its junction with the Fecht. Upon arriving at this point,
-about 2100, the company dep loyed west along the bank toward
t As K began to dig in, the lack of the detached platoon was
strongly felt; at midnight a group from Company B was inserted
between the two Third Battalion companies.
The night following our first attack came and suddenly all the
death we had seen, the noise we had heard, the fear we had
felt descended on us like an avalanche, leaving us only cold and
wet and exhausted . Our first day of attack was over. Even through
our tiredness we realized that each of us was a wiser man than
he had been the day before. We knew that battle was not
glorious; we knew that our minds had been left with an imprint
that even time could not fully erase ; we knew that we had been
through something that none of us would ever be able to adequately describe.
That night both I and K companies were harrassed: I by small
arms fire from positions across the river east of the bridge, K
by mortar and machine guns in the woods to the left front. I sent
a two-squad patrol around its right flank and across the river.
These men found and assaulted six foxholes. K discovered that the

- 20 -

mortar 1lre coming from its front was being directed hom an OP ;
after placing artillery on this position, the harassment was eliminated.
Only one further action re mained
for the regiment to
complete its mission around Hill
216 - that of "mopping up" the
west bank of the Fecht River
down to its junction with the
Weiss. At 0940 C jumped ofl
from its defensive position of the
night before to complete this
task and to contact the right
flank of the 7th Infantry just south
of the Chateau. As C began moving through the .open
fields
which separated them from the
thin strip of woods on the west
bank of the river, heavy fire from
machine guns and 88's pinned
the company down about 800 yards from the river. So intense was this fire that it became necessary for friendly artillery
to lay smoke. With this cover the company was able to gain the
edge of the narrow strip of woods along the river by 1400.
Upon completion of this, we had accomplished our first offensive mission. The green of our reputation lost another coat of
its vanishing brilliance. A new feeling of pride surged through
us - a pride born of combat - replacing the cold and the fatigue. Tested in fire, the regiment proved that it could fight beside
the veteran units of the famous Third Division. There was never
a day after Hill 216 that our heads did not rise just a little higher
when we said, "I'm from the 254th Infantry."

JJEBSHJEKM
Slightly before midnight on January 24th, the first elements of
the 28th Division began arriving to relieve us on position. By noon
of the following day, the entire regiment was assembled in an
area in the Colmar Forest northeast of Ostheim. The First Battalion
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was greatly understrength, A having only 120 line troops, B depleted to 80, ·c to about 120, and the machine gun platoons of D
with less tha"n half of their full strength. The Third Battalion had
also sustained a large number of casualties, although to a lesser
degree. Only the Second Battalion remained in good operational
strength.
Our stay in the Colmar Forest was destined to be a short one,
however, for another mission lay ahead of the regiment. The 15th
Infantry had, the previous day, cleared the area east of the Ill
River, pushing toward Reidwihr in its southward drive, leaving
isolated groups of enemy in its wake. The route from the west
toward the town of Jebsheim was now clear.
It had become apparent as the month of January drew to a
close that the hub of resistance, the key, to the entire Colmar
Pocket was the well fortified town of Jebsheim, France. The village itself is laid out in a way highly advantageous to the defender. The principal artery of the town is a north-south street with
stone buildings on either side. Branching off at both ends of the
main street are two parallel ones leading west. Weapons located
in the houses along these streets can effectively cover with crossfire almost all the area to the west of the town.
The Germans had skillfully supplemented Jebsheim's natural
defensive virtues. Along the street and road leading northwest,
heavy concrete bunkers had been built. In an arc extending above
the northwest street, a row of pillboxes defended to the north
while other steel reinforced emplacements at the southern end
completed the strong defensive system.
On the night of January 23, while the attack on Hill 216 was
still in progress, the tanks and tank destroyers attached to the
regiment had been released. Now they were attached once more.
Operation Instruction Number 8 specified that elements of the
Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of Company C, 601 st
·Tank Destroyer Battalion were to maintain contact with the 1st
DMI, follow the Second Battalion, and stand ready to reduce such
strong points as might be encountered . A light tank platoon of
Company C, 756th Tank Battalion, was to follow the tank destroyers, protecting the rear and assisting the battalions by fire. The
chemical mortar platoon and the AAA/ AW platoon remained attached as before.
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So swiftly had come the decision for the regiment to attack
Jebsheim that when the regimental staff and battalion commanders returned from Third Division Headquarters it was already the
hour set to launch the attack, 1600. There was time for only the
barest briefing possible to the company commanders . As we
moved out of the Colmar Forest, most of us knew only that the

First and Second Battalions were to be employed initially with
the First Battalion on the right maintaining contact with the 15th
Infantry driving south below Riedwihr while the Second Battalion
on the left linked itself with the 1st DMI by reconnaissance elements. The Third Battalion had been designated as regimental
reserve, to be used on Third Division order only.
At 1600 the two battalions moved out, each maintaining a two
company front - the First on the right side of the northwest road,
the Second on the left side. We had supposed that the operations
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of the 15th Infantry insured us an easy approach to the line of
departure. This proved untrue. Shortly after crossing the Ill River,
more than fifteen hundred yards short of the line of departure,
we received fire from machine guns and small arms in the northern
end of the Bois de Jebsheim as well as heavy artillery from the
vicinity of Jebsheim .
•
Sub-zero temperature combined with a fierce north wind which
whipped the deep snow into a frenzy of blinding ice particles
slowed our advance to a painful crawl as we fought our way through
artillery and rocket barrages to the line of departure. This was
reached at about 2100, and already the effect of the cold and
exertion began to show on us; the First Battalion especially suffered, their complete lack of sleep and rest for so many hours
making resistance very low.
Because of the difficulty which the Blind River presented, our
formation was changed at the line of departure to a column of
companies in each battalion. Upon traversing the road west of the
Blind River, the advance becpme even more difficult under the
machine gun, rifle, and p istol fire . We found that a detachment of
French troops had taken the burning buildings of Jebsheim Mills.
Even though we realized the danger of falling debris, shells
directed on the Mills, and the perfect outline our bodies made
against the bright flames, many of us were more than willing to
take the chance as we huddled for a few minutes as close to the
fire as possible. This was reportedly one of the coldest nights of
the entire winter; warmth seemed more important than safety.
At about 2230, G Company, leading the Second Battalion, crossed the Blind River. With two platoons abreast, one either side of
the road, the unit moved toward the town. After advancing a few
hundred yards, the company lost contact with the First Battalion
on the right and stopped.
The First Battalion meanwhile was running into difficult obstacles .
A Company, leading, waded across the icy, swift-flowing river.
Emerging on the west bank, the company was pinned down by
accurate heavy machine gun fire. Contact was lost as the men
of A, soaked from the waist down, crawled through the deep
snow. Company B inched its way from behind and finally contacted G.
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Both companies then moved along the northwestern approach
to the town. After another hour of slow advance, at 2030, the two
companies came within 400 yards of the outlying bunkers. Here
they were completely pinned down as fire rained on them from
three directions: the Bois de Jebsheim to the south, t he vicinity
of Grussenheim to the north, and the bunkers of Jebsheim to the
east. Mortar fire was placed on the bunkers, but was ineffective;
a patrol sent southwestward to silence the machine guns in the
Bois de Jebsheim met with failure as frozen weapons failed to
work for their frozen owners. So intense was the small arms and
artillery fire brought to bear on us that even after a fifteen minute
barrage by four battalions of field artillery, the resistance was
still so heavy that we could advance no further. At 0430 the two
leading companies began a withdrawal toward the Blind River.
The Second Battalion formed a defensive arc around the eastern
side of Jebsheim Mills while the First Battalion took positions in
a ditch several yards west of the north-south road.
Undoubtedly, this night was the most miserable the regiment ever
experienced. Each man had carried only one blanket into the attack, and most of these had been soaked when we crossed the
Blind. All of our clothing was wet either from the stream or from
the snow melted by our body heat as we lay in it. This had now
frozen to our skin. No fires could be lit. Those of us not on guard
slept. Somehow, the night finally ended.
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lhe foilowlng morning we counted our casualties, and met a new
enemy, one who accounted for five times as many men as the Germans - the dreaded trenchfoot. Men who could hardly . walk
hobbled back to aid stations to be evacuated to hospitals. The
First Battalion suddenly fell to less than company strength. The
Second Battalion, which had not been committed on Hill 216,
fared much better, although it, too, had a share of frozen hands
and trenchfoot.

Meanwhile, plans were being made to attack Jebsheim again
that evening . The volume of fire which had come from the Bois
de Jebsheim indicated that the clearing of this forest would require
considerable attention. Therefore, while the First and Second Battalions continued their attack on Jebsheim, the Third Battalion
would pass through Riedwihr and reduce the enemy holding in
the Bois de Jebsheim. This done, the Third was to advance eastward and assist in the taking of Jebsheim by an attack from the
south .

It was just getting dark on the evening of January 26 when the
Third Battalion moved out of Riedwihr. Company I was in the lead
as the troops crossed the little stream just east of Riedwihr. This
unit's mission was to clea r the patch of woods just north of the
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Riedwihr-Jebsheim road. Company L was to turn off the road to
the south and clear the upper half of the forest which lay on that
side; K was to keep to the right of L and sweep the southern half
of the woods.
I sent its three rifle platoons forward at 1700, two platoons
abreast, one to the rear. The two leading platoons came under
mortar and small arms fire, but were able to reach the eastern
edge of the woods. The reserve element was fired on and pinned
down by a well emplaced machine gun at the stream junction to
the north. Two squads sent to silence the gun were unable to
close in on the weapon, but it was finally eliminated by mortar
fire . Defensive positions were then placed along the east edge
of the woods and -the company remained here that night.
The attack of L began at 2100. Meeting little resistance, the
company turned south off the road , then pushed eastward, intending to advance to the east edge of the forest. However, a large
clearing in the center of the woods was mistaken, in the darkness,
for the fields beyond . When the company arrived at this clearing,
it went into defensive positions.
K jumped off and pushed due south through the western portion of the forest. The advance was successful until the company
was within a short distance of the clearing . At this point K encountered heavy fire from the southern edge of the woods, mostly
consisting of high velocity, flat trajectory fire. Unable to proceed,
the company fell back to Riedwihr, leaving one platoon in defensive positions at the point of farthest advance.
Meanwhile, the attack on Jebsheim had started at about the
same time the Third Battalion moved out. The objective remained
the same - - the northern half of the town to the Second Battalion,
and the southern half of the town to the First. F passed through
and led G, which was to protect the left flank. E remained
as battalion reserve in the defensive positions occupied the night
before by one of its platoons. Company C, with A followiog, launched the First Battalion's attack. B, initially to the rear of the other
companies, was to stand by until they had cleared, then strike the
southern part of the town.
Companies C and F waded through the deep snow toward the
bunkers which had turned them back the previous night. Moving
along the northwest road toward the junction at the western
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approach to the town, the battalions again met a furious hail of
fire about five hundred yards from the defending emplacements.
This was of the same pattern as that received the night before88mm fire from three directions, automatic weapons from the bunkers, and small arms from dug in positions around the pillboxes.
Slowly they moved forward, inching their way through the snow,
and attempted to reduce the fortifications with well-aimed bazooka fire. This p roved successful with all but one of the bunkers,
whose two foot thick walls merely ricocheted the rockets into the
air. As a last resort, the tank destroyers were brought up; braving
the dangerous 88's east of the town, these fired point
blank through the thick walls of the bunker and rendered possible
its capture by F Company men.
At this point Companies A and C, greatly understrength from
the battles of the last four days, joined with F for the final push
into town . At 2400 we saw one of the most awe-inspiring scenes
most of us can recall as eight battalions of artillery laid a concentration into Jebsheim which lasted for fifteen minutes. As we
watched it seemed as if the village, laying peacefully asleep one
moment, became nothing but a massive sheet of flame the next.
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Ely 0100, January 27, Company F and the remnants of the First
Battalion were on the northwest street of the town. Three hours
later Jebsheim was clear to the upper square. In this engagement,
which was extremely bitter while it lasted, G worked parallel to
F along northwest street. The now exhausted men of F organized
defensive
positions
in
houses
while G set up an arc
facing north toward G russenheim . Since little activity was observed in the southern part of the town, we believed that Jebsheim was clear except for snipers.

G Company that afternoon, therefore, began the task of clearing the north-south street . The unit soon discovered that our
surmise had been far from right. After an intense battle which
lasted all that day, G finally fought its way down to the lower
square. The fighting was of the most severe type possible- house
to house, floor to floor, room to room . Before the company had
time to prepare proper defense at the lower square, a strong
counterattack developed from the enemy position, and the
depleted unit was driven back through sheer weight of numbers
and fire power. The counterattack was finally repulsed at the
upper square.
The following morning, the 28th, the French desired to pass
through the town, but failed in their attempt to break the German lines. E Company then resumed the attack at 1400 to reduce
resistance in the southern end of Jebsheim . Gaining ·impetus as
the drive progressed smoothly and swiftly, the company was
across the intersection and about five houses down on the left
side of the street an hour later. 115 prisoners had been taken at
the cost of only 26 killed or wounded . At about 1700 the enerrw
launched another desperate counterattack, and as the company
was slowly forced to give ground, G was committed to aid them .
Together the two units repulsed the attack and made plans to
continue the advance at 0400 the following morning, January 29.
Just before the companies began their attack, three Germans
entered our lines and asked Company E to surrender, saying,
"We know you have only a company here and we have a battalion." The men of E opened fire in answer and began the last,
most bitter fight for the possession of Jebsheim .
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The enemy was being supplied and reinforced by the road
leading north into Jebsheim from Muntzenheim. To cut this road
and to provide a base of fire for I striking Jebsheim from the
south, the Third Battalion left its position in the Bois de Jebsheim
at 1130 that day. Leaving K in reserve, I and L moved out along
the road. Arriv i ng at the bridge over the small creek, Company L
turned south along the west bank to provide a base of fire for I
Company, wh ich was to move southeast, by-pass the tip of Jebsheim, and, turning sharply north, strike the enemy in the vineyards
just east of the German-occupied houses.
Heavy fire from these houses caused a change in l 's operation ;
a flank attack was decided upon. Accordingly, the unit moved in
by the road leading west from the southern end of the town. A
French tank encountered on the outskirts was persuaded to assist
them and the newly formed tank-infantry team attacked enemy
strongpoints on the west side of the north-south street.
At the time of their arrival, the fight between the Second Battalion and the enemy in his remaining houses was particularly
violent. Compressing the Germans into these few houses below
the southern square had necessitated the comm itm e nt o f th e
remain ing elements of the First Battalion as well as the reserve
company of the Second . From the houses, from the bunkers, and
from the foxholes in the vineyards southeast of the street crossing,
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the enemy resisted fiercely with automatic weapons while 88mm
guns poured fire 'on the attackers.
The impact of I, coupled with the blows being delivered by the
Second Battalion, broke the German's desire to resist further. At
about 1630 they began to march out of their foxholes, first in small
groups of five and ten, then in larger groups, to surrender. The total
was about 450, most of whom were members of 'the 136th Mountain
Regiment.
Jebsheim, itself, was now taken . The cost had been high, but
well worth the price we had paid
for it. According to statements
of prisoners of war, the town
had been used as
a corps
headquarters. It was not until
later that we learned that the
Third Division had not expected
us to be able to capture this
stronghold . The question as to
why our determination was so
strong, our fighting so fierce, in
taking this town was probably
best answered by one Pfc who
said, "If you think I was going
to stay out in some damn foxhole
full of snow while the Krauts were living in nice, warm cellars,
you're crazy!"

GGWATCH ON THE RHKNE
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While the battle for Jebsheim was in its final stages, Company
L, still on the banks of the little stream, was under heavy fire from
the road leading south of town. In terrain which offered little
concealment, L called for smoke; with the aid of this and strafing
operations of the Army Air Corps along the road, the unit was
released, and entered Jebsheim, now cleared .
Company K was immediately assigned the mission of pushing
southeast from Jebsheim, which they had entered by the ReidwihrJebsheim road, attacking down the Muntzheim road, and securing
the canal crossing just north of the latter town. The enemy still
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resisted below Jebsheim and south of the canal, b.u t after mopping
up the Germans left to fight delaying action, the company secured
the bridge. F was sent southeast of town immediately after its fall,
and held a line extending northwest from the canal crossing.
The regiment spent the night of January 29th in defensive positions to the east and mortheast of town, with the exception of
K along the canal and F extending north of the canal crossing. The
following morning the First Battalion moved to • the line which
Company F had held during the night. From this point the First, in
conjunction with the French armor on the left flank, attacked east
toward the Bois de Ia Hardt. Using A and B as a two company
front, (these two units, with elements of D attached, had less than
fifty men) the battalion advanced to the edge of the woods under
small arms fire. Here the French were met by
heavy bar.rage of
88mm guns emplaced in the woods ; not wishing to risk their armor, the French withdrew and requested that the First Battalion
draw back with them. They therefore returned to the line of departure and went into defensive positions extending north from
the canal.

a

The attack on the Bois de Ia Hardt and eastward toward the
canal junction was resumed on Februa ry 1. Having replaced the
First Battalion on the line of .departure, the Third Battalion moved
off at 0100 and advanced slowly against strong resisiance. Th is
was eliminated only after I Company made a determined charge
on the German positions and overran them . By 0730 the leading
elements were through the forest and on the west bank of the
Rhone Canal.
A series of swift moves began the following day as the Colmar
Pocket began to crumble. Early in the morning we received orders
to establish blocks along the Rhine River from Artzenheim to Biesheim as the 7th Infantry uncovered the Rhine on its advance south.
The Second Battalion was immediately alerted and at 0400 moved
out to follow the 7th Infantry with the mission of protecting the
rear and flank of that regiment while proceeding to outpost the
Rhine from Artzenheim to the vicinity of Baltzenheim. Later this
same day, the First Battalion moved to Kunheim and outposted
the Rhine River from Baltzenheim to the vicinity east of Kunheim .
The Third Battalion was assigned its holding sector from Biesheim
north to the j un ct ion of the Rhin e- Rhon e Cana l.
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These positions were held by the regiment until February 8th.
During this time we occupied positions on the very banks of the
Rhine River ; across this liquid barrier we could see mighty, formidable looking concrete pillboxes. Our stay here became known
as the " Watch on the Rhine. " Daily we wondered when the signal
would be given for us to cross the boundary between France and
the Nazi homeland. As we manned our positions under the glare
of "artificial moonlight," we speculated as to the difficulty of
making a successful bridgehead across this traditional bulwark of
the German nation. Few of .us suspected how many miles and
what bitter fighting lay between us and the day our crossing
would be made. On the morning of the 9th we began a truck
march to Montbronn where we were attached to the 100th Division upon arrival.
Thus ended our campaign in the Colmar Pocket.
However, we were not forgotten . On the 13th of February we
received a letter from Major General John W. O'Daniel, Commanding General of the Third Divis ion, which said, in part, "The
Regiment has fought with outstanding gallantry and perseverance. The Third Division salutes all members of the 254th Infantry
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as worthy comrades-In-arms. We are proud to have been associated with you and we regret your departure."
Two days later, we were visited by Lieutenant General Alexander Patch, Commanding the Seventh Army, who said he had come
all the way to Montbronn to tell us that he was "mighty glad to
have us."
In six weeks the 254th Infantry had acquired a fine reputation.
We meant to keep it in the months to come .
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Si~gfried Line

. _At

0050 on March 15 we were again tensely poised for the

.7'l launching of another attack-the most important of our combat
career. As we watched the artillery preparation, we recalled a
few of the past events that had preceded this vital assignment.
From the 8th of February until the 17th, we had remained attached to the 1DOth Division in the vicinity of Montbronn, France as
division reserve. Then, on the 17th, we received the orders we
had been awaiting so long : intsruction to return to our parent
unit, the 63rd Division.
We reported to Willerw ald, France, feeling rather like a prodigal
son who has left home, done well in the world and learned much,
but is glad to be back. Our experience· was immediately utilized
as the First Battalion was attached to the 253d Infantry in the
vicinity of Aursmacher, and the Second Battalion placed in division reserve at Steinbacher Hof. (The Third Battalion had remained
with the 1DOth Division in St. Louis and did not return until the
23rd of the month.)
The last week o i February and
the first two weeks of March the
Regiment fought as a unit, maintaining defensive positions northeast of Sarreguimines and con ducting extensive patrols and
raids. All during this time, . we •
thought of the objective which
someday awaited us : the breaching of the mighty Siegfried Line
which Dr. Goebbels had described for so many years to the
people of the world as "Germany's impenetrable Westwall. "
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And now, ten minutes before " H-hour," 0100, we realized how
difficult was the task which confronted us. The enemy, in the
preceding weeks, had been slbwly pushed back until he now
occupied his last, most formidabl~ barrier. We knew that he would
be determined to hold this at all costs. We knew, too, that the
ground which lay before the Siegfried Line was also well defended; trip wires, mines, and barbed wire criss-crossed the territory guarding these massive concrete structures, making a maze
of deathly, easily defended barriers.
Most of us felt strongly the responsibility of the confidence
which had been placed in us. Two days before, the Corps had
been assigned the mission of breaking the Siegfried Line in its
sector. In conjunction with this, the 63rd Division had been given
the task of making the initial attempt, and our regiment was
chosen as the assault element.
The p lan of attack had been skillfully prepared, and was easily
divided into three phases - first, the uncovering of the ground
stretching before the Siegfried Line by the First Battalion;
second, the establishment and holding of a block by the Third
Battalion ; and third, the breaching of the Siegfried Line by the
Second Battalion assisted by the First.
The First Battalion was to strike with such speed and impetus
that all outposts and fo rt ifications ly i ng before the Siegfried Line
would be eliminated before the enemy had further time to increase the effectiveness of these outer defenses. In this zone of
aq;tion were three t owns : Hartingshof, Eschringen, and Ensheim .
At last 0100 arrived, the preparatory barrage c eased, and a
great deal of tenseness which waiting always brings left as the
First Battalio n moved forward . C Company crossed the line of departure just east of Bli esranbach and began to move out of the
Hinterwald Woods just as a strong barrage of enemy art i llery
opened fire . Thus, before the ,attack had fully begun, ten men
were casualties . Nevertheless, within fifteen minutes the lead i ng
two platoons, abreast, had advanced nine hundred yards and
reached the edge of the small fortif ied village of Ha rtingshof.
This advance was so swift that the surprised enemy's rifle,
automatic weapons, and mortar fire were ineffective. Adv ancing
th rough a Schu-mine field, one platoon struck simultaneous ly
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with the other. Immediately, the defenders called
for an
intense barrage of mortar, rocket, and artillery fire, ineffective to
them in their concrete emplacments, although deadly to our exposed attackers. This, coupled with the large volumne of automatic
weapons fire pouring from the bunkers, provided a very bitter
fight which lasted almost three hours .
These reinforced positions were finally reduced by groups of
C "buttoning up" the aperatures while others under this covering fire, assaulted the bunkers hurling grenades through the openings. The company reorganized at 0400 to clear the surrounding
woods; in doing this, the unit captured approximately fifty prisoners and forced the retreat of several German tanks by
a·ccurate bazooka fire .
While C was taking Hartingshof, A had slruck simultaneously at
Eschringen. Like the other two rifle companies, this unit had a
platoon of heavy machine guns and a section of 81 mm mortars
attached from D and with this group moved through a minefield
soon after leaving the cover of the Hinterwald Woods. By being
extremely cautious, the company was able to penetrate this with
only two casualties.
It was of vital importance that the two bridges in the town be
taken intact to allow the armor which would follow later to cross
without delay. In view of this fact,
A decided to strike each of
these structures at the same time
with one platoon . After taking
the bridges, the platoons were
to expand their gains, using the
original objective as a center
of operations.
About half way to Eschringen, a
distance of little more than a mile,
they encountered barbed wire entanglements booby-trapped with
S-mines. After cutting a narrow
path and passing through this in
single file, the company deployed for the attack. Immediately
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after the race to the bridges began, machine gun and small arms
fire issued from the windows of many of the houses in the town.
Nevertheless, both spans were quickly secured and the demolition wires cut to the large mines beneath them before the
enemy was able to discharge them. In expanding their hold upon
the town, A met fierce resistance which lasted only a short time,
however. After capturing the town, it was necessary to send a
platoon to one of the hills surrounding it in order to eliminate the
shelling the unit was receiving from 88mm guns emplaced there.
Eschringen was then outposted following the sucessful completion
of this mission.
While A and C Companies were initially fighting for Eschringen
and Hartingshof, respectively, B prepared to follow A as ?Oon as
that organization had cleared Eschringen sufficiently for B to pass
through on its route to attack Ensheim. Thirty minutes after "H-hour,"
the unit crossed the line of departure and followed the route that
A had taken. When the company arrived in Eschringen, the men
found that the attackers had already taken the bridges and were
in the process of clearing the town. Since speed was essential,
they passed through the town immediately and started for their
objective. However, in the darkness and under the fire of a
heavy barrage, the company mistook the road leading into Ommersheim for the one to Ensheim.
After advancing approximately five hundred yards on this
highway, the company encountered an anti-tank gun emplaced
in the middle of the road and well defended by infantrymen
dug in around it. After a hard fight, with several casualties from
the fire of the gun, B eliminated this obstacle and proceeded
toward its objective. The advance was slow, however, for a
series of saw-tooth trenches ran parallel to each side of the
road; the enemy fought a delaying action from these.
Finally, they entered the outskirts of the village and after
another difficult fight, in which large quantities of German artillery were poured at them, the company was able to occupy most
of the houses in the western part of town. It was from these
that they were able to drive off the numerous counterattacks
that came until dawn. Both the company and the artillery radio
ilad been destroyed during the fight into the village, so it was impossible to call for artillery support. Only the weapons of the
company, itself, could be used in dispersing the counterattacks.
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just before dawn the company realized that it had taken the
wrong road and was now in Neumuhlerhof instead of Ensheim ;
two volunteers, therefore, started back· to Battalion Headquarters at Eschringen with this message just before the largest and
most vicious of all the counterattacks struck. This was beaten off
at the cost of most of the company 's remaining ammunition.
When these messengers reached their destination, at about
0700, the First Battalion had already realized the error that B
had made. However, the battalion had already reached a point
a Imost a thousand yards in front of the unit to its right, and an
attack on Ensheim would increase this to two thousand yards,
leaving a greatly exposed right flank. Although B had made a
tactical mistake, their position was strategically good, for it protected the otherwise vulnerable right flank . Therefore, the message was sent back to the company in Neumuhlerhof to hold and
secure the ground they had taken until the unit in whose sector
they were relieved them .
C arrived in Eschringen, after having cleared out all opposition north of Hartingshof, at about 0730 and received the order
to attack Ensheim. After a short reconnaissance, the company
decided to move up the draw slightly to the east of Ensheim
and strike the southeastern part of !he town. At the same time,
a platoon of tanks would move up the road between the two
towns and fan out in the fields before the objective to support
C with direct fire.
As the company began moving forward, they met an enemy
counterattack which was in the process of forming in this same
draw.

The
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The attached tanks opened up at point blank range on the
houses C was attacking in one of the finest examples of infantryteam cooperation that the regiment has ever witnessed. Although
the initial resistance was very heavy from small arms and panzerfausten fire, the accuracy of the friendly tanks soon enabled the
company to gain the foothold it needed in the southern part of
town.
All morning this bitter fighting raged, as the enemy resisted
from house to house; the Germans seemed determined that the
price for Ensheim should be high. At 1330, A Company was also
thrown into the desperate fight against the Nazis. Massive German Tiger Tanks delivered devastating fire at both of the units
as well as the attached armor, but eventually were forced to
retreat to the protection of the Siegfried Line as the Volksgrenadiers supporting them were slowly eliminated by the men of the
First Battalion .
As darkness fell, the town was ours. All of us realized that the
First Battalion had done an excellent job, and we resolved that
we would uphold the example they had set. The stage was now
set for the Third Battalion to begin its attack. In the early morning
hours, this unit began arriving in Ensheim.
Very little was actually known about the Siegfried Line, as
ground reconnaisance had been impossible; no one had ever tried
to test the strength of the pillboxes which composed this supposedly finest of all static lines. Some things, however were
known . We know that prior to our attack the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his artillery and rocket projectors as well as
men and other materiel to these fortifications. We were well
oriented, also, on the fact that the line was designed to stop an
attacker by its horizontal depth rather than by vertical depth,
such as the Maginot Line. Intelligence had informed us that the
p illboxes which . studded the ridges in th~ area relied on interlocking fire by small groups of six or seven emplacements to
mutually support each other and stop any attacker even as many
as half of them were reduced. In addition to this, the ground between the emplacements was honey-combed with a network of fire
and communication trenches which would probably be used before it became necessary to retreat to the cover of the concrete
structures.
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The terrain of this area wa's such that the only avenues of approach were over exposed slb.pes uAder direct enemy observation
from the left, front, and right Between Ensheim and Bishmisheim
the defenses were based on the commanding ridges which overlooked all avenues leading north from Ensheim. The line at this
point consisted of three belfs, with the third containing most of
the artillery, mortar, and rocket emplacements.

-r~e~-a-~~~~ ~~
PO~

It was the task o~ f.ne Third Battalion to sleze a strongly defended hill in the Si~~fl'iEild and block the lin-e on the Division left
flank. This unit was to act as a hinge on which the door to the
Siegfried Line would be opened; If this hinge did not hold, the
line could not be pierced with the rapidity which was desired.
Therefore, the Third Battalion had two missions: to gain the initial
fortifications, and to hold these positions at all costs.
The approach march began at 0400, under a fairly heavy barrage
concentrated on the entire Siegfri'ed Line; this was designed to
be so light that the enemy would not expect an attack, yet intense
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enough to serve as a screening tactic. The line of approach followed the main highway toward the Siegfried until it reached a
small unimproved road which branched off to the west. After
traversing this for several hundred yards, a cross-country route was
taken to avoid the possibility of the roads becoming impact areas
in case the attack was detected.
Daylight found the battalion assembled in the draw below the
hill which was to be assaulted. While the companies deployed in
the draw, a slight skirmish took place between scouts and the
enemy in open emplacements. A hasty reconnaisance was ' then
made and the three pillboxes which guarded the southeastern
slope of the hill were chosen as the most propitious for the initial
assault.
K was designated the assault company, and it was decided to
use the platoon of heavy machine guns attached to that unH from
M with the organic lights to neutralize the pillboxes by making
them close their aperatures. All guns would open up together at
1041, K would then rush the fortification as soon as they were
neutralized.
The machine guns and two platoons of the assault element had
just crossed the draw ready to deploy for the attack when suddenly it seemed as if all the fire which lay in the deep bellies of
these mighty fortresses belched forth at once. The din of the
artillery, mortar, and rocket fire was so tremendous that only
occasionally could the staccato sound of the many machine guns
in each pillbox be heard. This fire was so intense that one platoon
of K found it impossible to cross the draw and join the remainder
of the company.
Nevertheless, the attack began on schedule as the machine guns
commenced their fire at the designated time on the pillboxes
selected for the assault. It soon became apparent that the aperatures could never be completely "buttoned up" by a concentration
of automatic
weapons. Therefore, K, bolstered by assault
squads from I and L Companies, began its onslaught into the
cones of fire to reduce the enemy by whatever means were
available.
In this in itial phase of the reduction of the pillboxes each of
the three assaulting groups could only experiment with methods
for the elimination of the emplacements and those within. Bazooka
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teams braved all types of fire to stand up and use their charges
against the heavy steel doors which guarded the entrance to the
pillboxes. They watched, disappointed, as they saw the ineffectiveness of their rockets against the steel which far exceeded in
depth the penetrability of their weapon. Men crawled within fifteen or twenty feet of the steel sheilds which protected the embrasures to fire antitank grenades which had no effect other than
concussion. Others, with satchel charges, worked their way slowly
and laboriously toward the pillboxes in order to place the·ir explosives at the huge steel doors. Again, the results were the
same.

Finally, one or two men volunteered to work their way to the
roofs of the emplacements they were attempting to smash. Here
each of these successful enough to gain the top found a ventilation shaft jutting from the top of the structure. First, ordinary
fragmentation grenades were dropped down the small hatches;
at least one of these men was wounded as all found that these
charges merely rolled through a trap door only to explode in the
open beside the p_illbox.

- 43 -

........._...., .•

-~·«

The assault groups tried again. Two methods were at last found
which drove the defenders from their huge emplacements. One
group suspended a bangalore torpedo from the top of the pillbox
down the ventilation pipe and :detonated it. The great concussion
caused by this explosion wound'e d or stunned those inside the
structure and caused them to op~n their doors and surrender.
The other two groups used a more dangerous, although just as
effective, method. The machine gun fire which kept the aperatures
closed was lifted. When the Germans opened these in order to
fire their guns, they found either ,a white phosphorous or a !hermite
grenade thrown at them by a, man pressed against the side of the
pillbox next to the aperature. The burns sustained by t~e defenders were so severe that they, to.o, surrendered in order to receive
medical care.
That afternoon, at 1530, under the heavy artillery, mortar, and
rocket barrage which was directed at our troops, the last of the
seven pillboxes which studded the hill was taken. The two companies which were at the foot of the hill awaiting its capture
had also been subjected to extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and
artillery fire during this period. The ground in which it was necessary for these units of the Third Battalion to dig their foxholes
was extremely wet. Water seeped in almost as fast is it could be
bailed out.
I and L Companies were brought to the crest of the hill in a
mopping up operation to eliminate some remaining r~sistance by
snipers. Meanwhile, K had reorganized and at 1600 moved out
toward Hill 386 in accordance with the original plan. The Operations Instructions had called for two companies to secure hills on
an arc to the northeast as the remainder of the battalion advanced to the St. Ingber! Highway upon the completion of the breaching of the pillboxes which had just been taken. However, a few
minutes after K had left for its objective, the battalion was ordered to "cease further offensive action."
It was at this time that we completely realized in what a precarious position was the Third Battslion. No unit was abreast
on either the right or left. The nearest troops on the right flank
were 2000 yards behind, in Ensheim. The left flank had its support
even further back. Therefore, the enemy could concentrate all his
strength against this one battalion to eject it from the line. With
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three sides exposed, offensive act ion against the unit would b e
a _simple matter. It was scare ly feasible that reinforcements could
,\ be brought from the vic inity of Enshe im, for the deep draws that
surrounded the hill were un d er excellent observation and murderous fire.

A patrol from I ·company was fired upon by advance elements
of a strong counterattack and in a few minutes the entire battalion, which had hardly had time to adequately outpost its defense,
was engaged in an effort to drive this off. After a stiff fight, in
which many of the Germans infiltrated to within a few yards of
the battalion 's line by means of the communication trenches which
stetched all along the Westwall, the enemy withdrew that night
under the cover of darkness.
By the time the message " cease further offensive action" had
been received, however, K had already departed for its destination, meeting only light artillery resistance. Although an effort
was made to contact the company, both the unit's radio as well
as the artillery radio with the Forward Observer failed to operate.
The,~ company had just teached its destination and begun to dig
in when a counterattack, supported by artillery, hit them from
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the _north, east, and west. The fight which ensued was of an intense nature, K suffered heavy casualties due to the fact that
there had been insufficient time to prepare adequate defensive
positions. Despite these casualties the attack was broken up
shortly after dark, although attempts were made that night to
infiltrate our lines.
Just after dawn the artillery radio was repaired and the message received, "Have King and friends come in tactically." This
order, coupled with the sounds of heavy shelling, convinced the
company that the battalion was sustaining another counterattack,
the message was therefore interpreted to mean that K would
have to fight its way back. At the time the withdrawal began
another counterattack struck from the north; an artillery barrage
was immediately placed on their recently vacated position to act
as a screen.
So heavy had been the casualties during the hectic night that
one entire platoon was used to carry the wounded between
the two assaulting platoons. As K came within sight of the
battalion area they found their premise to be correct : the
battalion was engaging a large number of Germans . Unnoticed,
the company moved within fifty yards of those who were attacking the lines of I _Company. When K reached the absolute
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mm1mum safety range between our artillery and themselves, they
had the curtain of fire lifted and assaulted the bewildered enemy.
The result of this one assault, by actual count, was seventy enemy
killed.
Shortly after K had been assigned a sector in the perimeter defense, a patrol of platoon size sent to look for any remaining
wounded intercepted a German major with a small group of men.
The capture was easily made, and in an immediate interrogation
the officer admitted that an even stonger counterattack was scheduled for that afternoon. Soon after this information had been
disseminated, the enemy again struck in what seemed a last fana tical attempt to retake the hill. It was only after an hour and a
half of very bitter fighting that these forces were turned back,
with an estimated loss of fifty percent of the three hundred and
fifty engaged in the attack.
This proved to be the last of the attempts by a~tack to regain
the vital block the Third Battalion had established. Nevertheless,
for the following two days and nights, the hill remained a virtual
holocaust as the Germans began firing every available weapon in
an attempt to drive the battalion from the hill through sheer fire
power. 210 and 150mm artillery crashed into the soft earth with
explosions that shook the emplacements and filled the air for a
few seconds with hundreds of deathly steel splinters. High velocity
shells from 88 and 75mm guns smashed into the sides of the pillboxes and blended with sounds of the multi-sized mortar and
fire-tailed rockets also crashing into the hill.
Never before had any unit in the regiment taken such a sustained, high pitched barrage. But the Third Battalion took all that
the enemy had to give, knowing that every, shell thrown at them
was one less with which the units making the breakthrough would
have to contend. The block had been made and would be held.

THJE BREAKTHROUGH
The rest of us in the regiment, feeling as helpless as a cheering
section in a football game, watched the magnificent fight the
Third Battalion staged to take the vital hill which would serve as
as block for our operations. Ensheim., lightly but persistently
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shelled, was the scene of continuous activity as we prepared to
strike the line with all our weight as soon as the block was firmly
established. Casualties poured into ready aid stations when
darkness permitted the evacuation of the wounded from the hill.
Once again we marvelled at the speed and efficiency with which
each case was treated by the medics, then sped to the rear toward
an evacuation hospital. Somehow, each of us felt a bit more
confident as we realized the care and swift attention we would
receive if our luck momentarily deserted us.

From the better vantage points in Ensheim we could see, on
this spring-like day, the entire line spread before us. The long
belts of dragon's teeth, row after row as far as the eye could see,
added to the formidable picture of hundreds of massive grey
pillboxes commanding every hill, every slope. In contrast to the
partially covered route the Third Battalion had been able to
employ, the only approach to the fortification which guarded the
main highway we must neutralize for the armor was through
open ground, affording almost no cover. We knew that there was
only one way the reduction of this maze of steel and concrete
could be made - by moving straight into all the fire they could
throw at us, take our casualties as they came, and reduce the
pillboxes one by one.
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Although the attack to smash the fortifications which guarded
the Ensheim-St. lngbert Highway was originally to start soon after
dawn, the heavy counterattack that the Third Battalion was sus taining made necessary a postponement until this could be repulsed. However, the Second. Battalion had already moved from
the positions it had obtained by following the Third Battalion the
previous day. These were almost due north of Ensheim at an
approximate distance of a thousand yards along the unimproved
road running somewhat parallel to the highway. Shortly after 0800
the Battalion was in an assembly area five hundred yards
southeast of the blocking position . Not until they had received
word that the counterattack ..had been repulsed did the Second
move into the long-awaited attack.
E, assigned the position of assault element, was followed by
G , while F remained in the assembly area as battalion rese rve.
Due north was the direction of the attack as shells and long range
machine gun fire rained on the attackers in an attempt to stop the
group before it reached the vicinity of the pillboxes which were
to be struck. Even under this intense fire and irregardless of the
fanatical effort of the defenders to hold their g round, E wa s
able to level two bunkers and capture two pillboxes by noon.
This was accomplished despite the fact that one platoon had
been pinned down by very effective f ire from one of the emplacements. The other two nevertheless swing to the left to attempt the
reduction of three large pillboxes on the left side of the road .
After a savage fight which featured a long, uphill crawl by several
men who braved the artillery and automatic weapons fire to
throw thermite grenades into the opened aperatures of the emplacements, this group of fortifications was eliminated and the
entire company moved southward in an attempt to take from the
rear the positions which were protecting the dragon's teeth .
G, meanwhile, had also been commited to attack northward and
take the group of pillboxes in the draw to the west of the highway; Just as G was coming abreast of E at 1800, a large armorsupported counterattack struck from the direction of the draw to
the east. Although the company saw the large body of Germans
coming behind the deep line of tanks, it was imposs ible to get
artillery on the attackers because the radio was temporarily out
of order. (There is good reason for our maxim, " The radio always
works - exept when you need it the most! " )
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A few minutes later, G was engaged in the most caustic battle
of its entire career. Our men were determined that they would not
withdraw from the ground which held the pillboxes gained at the
cost of many comrades' lives and shattered hopes. To be forced
to give way at this time would mean that each yard, each trench,
each fortification would have to be purchased again for the
bloody price which had already been paid. E, directly behind G,
was in a position that made it impossible to lend much support to
efforts to staunch the drive of the two enemy infantry companies
aided by two platoons of tanks. It was impossible to comm it f because that unit was being very effectively pinned down by
streams of fire from the emplacements which commanded the
draw.
G managed to do the only thing which prevented its complete
eradication - closed on the enemy so that the Germans could
not call artillery for fear of annihilating their own unit. Our attach·
ed tank destroyers and tanks valiantly engaged the enemy's armor
in a long range duel, keeping the German high velocity guns off
us. For two hours the company was able to stave off attack after
attack as all available ammunition was rushed from the other units
in the battalion. At last, around 2000, so much had been expended
that the situation became acute. The withdrawal order came a11d
the depleted company, following the rest of the batta li on, slowly
pulled back to the positions it had occupied the night before
along the unimproved road running parallel to the main highway.

,

Spirits were very low as we realized that all of the progress we
had made that day had gone for nought. It was not until a reorganization began in E Company about midnght that it was discovered that eighteen men had been left in pillboxes the unit
had taken. We hardly dared hope that there was d possibility that
these comrades still held the emplacements. In the confusion that
is always the keynote of battle, no one was sure how many of the
eighteen were wounded; we only knew that some of the men had
been left to guard and aid those who had fallen until evacuation
could be safely effected. The demands which the counterattack
made on us at the time of the withdrawal had driven all remembrance of them from our brain .
Early the following morning, two squads were sent from E to
guard the litter bearers on their approach to the pillboxes with
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the further mission of defending the fortifications if we still occupied them. When this group reached the emplacements, they
found all eighteen men, ten of whom were wounded, still it1
posS'ession. The casualties were carried back to "Weasels" parked
along the road held by the Second Battalion. That afternoon a
platoon from G relieved the two squads in the three pillboxes.

Two task forces were organized in conjunction with plans for
the Second to continue the attack that day. Task Force Number
One, consisting of a platoon from A, a platoon of tanks and a platoon
of tank destroyers, was to guard a team of engineers as they
prepared a crossing of the mined ground in front of the dragon's
teeth. Moving out at about 1500, the task force moved along the
highway north of Ensheim, the Ensheim-Stankelkapchen road, to
take covered positions north of these tank barriers and provide
protection from either an armored or infantry attack. Very little
resistance was met until the group was within two hundred
yards of their objective. Here they were pinned down by artillery
and automatic weapons fire. Nevertheless, the mission was accomplished by 1930.
Task Force Number Two, which was composed of one platoon
each of Company A, of tanks, and of tank destroyers, was to
attack and take the small village of Ensheimer Hof. After leaving Ensheim at 1430, the task force headed through Gehrle woods
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and Kirkelbach Creek to their destination, which was captured
a hour and a half later under only light artillery resistance. The
tanks and tank destroyers then returned to Ensheim while the
infantry platoon outposted the town.
Once again the Second Battalion threw itself into the attack at
1630 that afternoon with F in the assault. Once again it seemed as
if every gun in this mighty defense opened up as the defenders
showed their determination to stop any advance. Using tank
destroyers and tanks to full advantage, the company managed
to reduce three of the large fortifications in the sector as well
as several smaller ones. This was accomplished in the most devastating fire under which any unit of the regiment had ever
fought. The exl")austed state of those in the Second Battalion forced the ceasing of this offensive soon after dark. Again we
noticed the phenomena which never fails to surprise men in
battle: one may fight almost indefinitely without feeling fatigue,
but as soon as he allowed to rest, all the exertion he has expended seems to fall on him at once, and he drops into a deep
sleep.
The following morning the attack was resumed with F still the
assault element. Although the first two pillboxes were taken
with very little resistance, the enemy suddenly seemed, to
realize that this day must be his last, most desperate attempt
to stop the invader. For ten straight hours, from 1000 to 2000, we
received the most intense shelling in our entire combat experience. Every weapon in that sector of the Siegfr ,ed Line was
trained on us in a I saturation
bombardment which consisted of
every size German weapon small, medium, and large mortar,
light and heavy artillery, high
velocity anti-tank guns, and all
sized rockets were unleashed in
a fury of explosion and fire .
During all of this, F supported
by the remainder of the Second
as well as by tank destroyers
and tanks, took a total of eigh·
teen pillboxes.
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C Company had also been committed with the m1ss1on of
clearing the fortifications east of the crossroads. Just before
midnight of this day, the 19th, the last pillboxes which guarded
the highway were eliminated. In addition to capturing these
boxes, C took prisoner almost and entire company as well as a
battalion commander. The way was now clear for the mighty
armor to be unleashed into the Rhine Valley.
The 254th Infantry was the first unit in the Seventh Army to blast
a path through the Siegfried Line. In five days we had cracked a
defense which had taken seven years to build, had drained
the financial resources of the nation that built it, and had been
called by many of the world's leading military strategiests "impenetrable."
·
Although the highway was free of opposition, there still remained some fortifications in our regimental sector to clear. F Company, therefore, continued to thee east and by 0400 had taken seven
more pillboxes and captured the Germans who manned them.
Two hours later the Second and Third Battalions were alerted for
early offensive action as the armor rumbled through. At this same
time Company A sent a platoon sized combat patrol to Ober
Wurtzbach; two hours later this town had fallen after light resistance, and the unit captured forty prisoners. At 0900 the remaining two platoons of A reconnoitered the twelve pillboxes which
remained untaken in our sector. Each of these was found deserted.
That afternoon, as we waited to move through the defense we
had broken, we watched the tanks roar past us, cutting deeper
into the Nazi homeland. We realized then that the heavy price we
had paid had not been too high. The world was one big day
closer to peace.
After we had read the telegram sent us that morning, "Congratulations from the officers and men of the Third Infantry Division,"
we wearily started through the gap we had made. We wondered
what new task lay ahead of us. Whatever it could be, we somehow knew that we would be able to do it.
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Chapter IV

/

he Siegfried Line had been breached; as troops and equipment
began to pour through the hole we had made, a new problem
presented itself throughout the Seventh Army front: the enemy
must now be sought in order that he be completely defeated. The
situation was fluid . There were no more definite German lines
just as there were no longer any static friendly ones. For a week
the only uniformed enemy we saw were the those who raised
their hands high over their heads at our approach.

~

For the first time we saw entire towns and villages fully peopled with the "Master Race." The population, for the most part,
seemed dazed as we would enter a town, contact the Burgomeister, and requisition the best homes for ourselves. There were
always a few who would greet us with broad smiles and enthusiastic waves and another few who could not disguise the hate
which burned in their eyes and glowed in their faces. The great
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majority were so deferential that their attitude approached servility as they lavished us with food and liquor.
We found that the famous German schnapps, which they seemed
to enjoy so much, tasted to us like an unholy combination of
gasoline, kerosene, and ether, with just a dash of quinine. The
beer was little better; instead of the thick, heavy brown liquid
we had expected, we were given only a light amber substance
which tasted as bitter as our Halazoned water. Only the cognac,
vermouth, and recaptured French wines met with the approval of
the those who enjoyed the pleasure of the bottle.
Perhaps we were most amazed at the clothing these poeple
wore. A stroll down the main artery of Neunkirchen or MitfeiBexbach (the street was probably named Adolf Hitler StraBe every town had one) on Sunday afternoon seemed little different
than a similiar promenade along Main Street in Peoria or Hoboken.
Women wore well-cut woolen suits or dresses, silk stockings, and
silly hats ; furcoats were no more uncommon than in the States.
Only the well-worn shoes indicated that Germany had been
waging war for seven years. There were no young men; only
boys and old men represented the male population. The youngsters had shed their leather week-day shorts and wore knickers
with soft shirts and sport coats. The men dressed just as all old
men dress - conservatively, in blue or gray or black.
In sharp contrast to the excellent ga rments afforded by the
natives was the clothing worn
by the DP's, or Displaced Persons. These unfortunates, who
had been taken from their homelands by the German war machine to relieve the critical manpower shortage which total mobilization had caused, had been
treated on a par with our slaves
in Ame rican Colonial Days. Individual treatment varied with the
respec ti ve " owners," but even
those who were well fed w ere
extremely i ll -c lad .
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As we rolled deeper into Germany, the roads became more and
more clogged as these people fled from those who had enslaved
them. Nothing seemed important except traveling as for and as
fast as possible toward the i r native lands each day. French, Belgians, and Dutch hurried westwa rd walking, bicycling, or pushing
baby carraiges and carts ; Poles, Slavs, and Russians fled eastward with their miserable possessions strapped on their backs
or piled in wagons. We enjoyed many cups of black coffee because we knew that the condensed milk which came in our
"1 0-in-1 " rations had gone to feed a t iny Pol ish baby whose
starved mother was unable to feed it . We tc.,ok clothing, warm
clothing, from the houses of the Germans to give it to t hose who
were once again returning to life.
In southern Germany we found that the people were very devout, went to church regularly, and refused to work on the Sabbath. We could never reconcile these Nazi homes filled with
religous paintings and books. Across the room from a copy of
" The Last Supper" was sure to be a photograph of Der Fuhrer; in
the bookshelves, " Mein Kampf" would rest beside the Bible.
Most of the homes in this territory were new with all modern
conveniences. In the farm villages, many of the houses were
heated with steam, had electric stoves, and beautiful furniture ;
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even the poor possessed new, expensive looking furnishings.
Germany had done well in her systematic rape and loot of Europe.
Looting was strictly forbidden, but cameras, field glasses, and
pistols seemed tci appear everywhere. Our corner meetings
began to sound like a convention of the National Photographers
Guild as focal lengths, depth of focus, the relative merits of
Scheiner and Din tests, and the advantages of Leica over Contax
became the center of discussion .
. We were never able to stay away from the children - even
German children- and we soon learned what they meant by asking
for "Cowgoomie." As we handred over a stick we might say
something about "these darn Kraut kids," but they got the gum.
It did not take us long to realize that the average German was
a bewildered person. All his sense of moral values and his philosophy of life were fashioned by the deluge of propaganda that
had characterized life under the Nazi regime. Now everything he
had been told to believe in- mainly Power and the Invincibility
of th_e Wehrmacht - was being swept away by the surge of the
allied armies sweeping into his homeland. In his hour of need,
there was nothing to which he could turn. Religion, while outwardly a strong influence in his life, had been so subjugated to
the stronger demands of the Nazi party that it could not now
take the place of that dominant feature of ech German's life.
Education had become only a refined tool of Nazi propadanda.
For the time being, at least, they could see no hope of salvation;
everywhere we went we heard them say, "Alles, a lies kaput. "

Sixty-five miles and eight days after we had blasted a path
through the Siegfried we were again on the banks of the Rhine.
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As we rode on a pontoon bridge across this traditionally sacred
stream, we could see in the distance the flash of big guns
denoting that once again the German Wehrmacht was attempting
to form some sort of a static line.
It soon became apparent to all of us exactly what they were
attempting to do. By leaving small groups of their best troops,
bolstered by the SS, they hoped to purchase, even at the cost
of complete annihilation of these delaying groups, the essential
time it would take to form somewhere a line defense.
Speed became as essential to us as time to them. So hard and
so swiftly must we hit these holding troops that it would be impossible for the main body of Germans to again organize an
effective defensive stand. So fierce and so sustained must be
their fight that enough time would be gained to eventually
stop us.
· The troops we met, for the most part, were of the most fanatical type possible. They relied on the superior fire power of
automatic weapons to supplant their lack of men. The partial
success of these tactics is well attested by the fact that ·in the
month of April, we had almost one hundred more battle casual ties than in March. Almost twice as many men were killed in action
than during the entire month when we hit the Siegfried Line!
We found, however, that the soldier had greatly changed since
the days he fought in France or even in the Siegfried Line. Always before he had fought until there was no chance of winning, and then had withdrawn, if possible, or surrendered if not.
Now the enemy was divided into two groups: those who fought
fanatically for the Fatherland, willing to die for their Nazi beliefs,
and those who saw that further resistance was futile and surrendered readily, even giving at times valuable information to help
stop the useless destruction of lives, homes, and property.
Different than any other combat period we had ever experienced, there could never be any rest, any let down in alertness. None
of us knew just where the enemY. was. We would pass through
two or three towns without encountering a single soldier; then,
without warning, the fourth would be fanatically defended and
we would have to fight hour after hour in order to enter some
small village. Continually we moved. Day after day and night after
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night the advance continued southward; we must not give them
time to form another defensive line! We had to keep moving
even though we were so exhausted that no longer anything seemed important except rest and sleep. And still the Germans fought
for time.

For the first time we felt the shocking impact of rear guard
tactics. In our onrush, we would fail to uncover small pockets of
German soldiers who would play havoc with our supply routes and
communication paths until it became necessary to dispatch large
numbers of our own troops to flush them from their hiding places.
In addition, it was impossible to maintain proper liaison between our own units and even neighboring regiments because of
the rapidity of our advance. When a town was approached by
elements of a front line unit, the group was often uncertain as to
whether or not the town had been taken. Many villages were
captured by a single jeep taking the wrong road; l"fl.~ ny men
were reported missing when a wrong turn led them to a defended town. At times a company would suddenly find itself five to
ten miles ahead of any adjacent organization; if the enemy realized this, he would strike, and another bloody battle would ensue.
It became apparent about the middle of April that the Germans
were attempting to reorganize on the banks of the Danube River, and
our headlong drive became known as the "Race for the Danube."
At times it looked as if we .w ere going to lose that race. Our
path was well marked with the bodies of our fallen comrades.
There are places along this route that we shall · never forget:
Hoherot, Osterburken, Krautheim, the Jagst River, Dorzbach, lngelfingen, the Kocher, Kunzelsau, Rublingen, Jungholzhausen, and
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Schwabisch Hall. There are other places, too-many of them
among the 125 towns we took-that a single sniper will never
let us forget. During this "complete rout" of which the headlines
screamed, we received more than 600 replacements.
On the 24th of April, we realized that we were within a day
of the Danube. A fast shuttling system which we had been using
for several days had sped our progress considerably . . Late that
evening the •:=irst Battalion, which was the assault element, uncovered
a strong enemy pocket at Gerstetten and were engaged in clearing that town when a message was received from Battery B of
the 862d Field Artillery that they were being attacked by a company of German infantry. C Company was immediately motorized
and moved quickly by truck to the town of Hinchstitten where
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they routed the enemy unit. It was a great pleasure, they said,
to come to the aid of those who had always supported us when
our own position was precarious.
Advancing very swiftly under no resistance the next day, the
First Battalion arrived in Reidheim on the northern bank of the
Danube at 1500 on the 25th. Amazed, they discovered that the
bridge was still intact. Immediately troops began to pour across
under sporadic machine gun and artillery fire. However, only one
platoon of A had made its way over the structure and into the
town of Leipheim on the other side when a flag was waved from
the church tower and the bridge was blown. Immediately, this
one platoon began to receive very heavy fire from automatic
weapons emplaced in build ings all along the main street of the
town.
Fortunately, however, the demolition job had not been thorough,
and the other two platoons of A were able to lay boards
across the uprights under the protection of a strong base of fire
built by the remainder of the battalion. Nevertheless, it took some
time to obtain the material for the ramp and to correctly place
it on the uprights while under fire, and for an hour and a half
the one platoon across the river held alone a tiny bridgehead in
this last, desperate bulwark of the once "invincible" Wehrmacht.
At last, around 1630, all of Company A managed to cross the
makeshift bridge, and two hours later the rest of the battalion
was also in Leipheim. Only a few minutes after the town was
lightly outposted, and while the houses were sti ll being searched
for snipers, a counterattack struck from the direction of the airport to the southeast. Two companies and three tanks smashed
into the left flank of the town, which was being defended by
8 Company, and after two hours of intensive fighting, in which
the enemy inflicted twenty-four casualties on that unit alone, the
attack ·shifted to the part of town being held by A Company.
The en~my was well supported with two and four barrelled
88mm anti-aircraft guns which they leveled at the town in a barrage which approached the intensity of that received in the
Siegfried Line. All artillery within range was called in an effort
to turn back the attackers; the Second Battalion was brought
from Reidheim, and finished crossing the Danube at about 2200.
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Two hours later, after suffering many casualties, the regiment
drove the Germans from the town.
Once more the enemy struck, this time at dawn the next day. Even
larger numbers of German troops poured from the vicinity of the
airfield. This time we were better prepared, and the full impetus
of the attack was never allowed to reach the town, although
small groups of Germans managed to fight their way into Leipheim. This attack was also broken up; actually, the retreat of the
enemy became almost a rout, with the result that our two day
prisoner count was swelled to 698, the largest of any like period
in our history.
For the first time since we had been committed on the 1st day
of January, we were pulled off the line for a rest. We were to
guard targets in the vicinity of Rothenburg, Germany. Our combat
days in Europe were over. For two weeks we listened to the radio
and waited for 'the news we knew was sure to come. No longer
did we hear the roar of the artillery, the death rattle of the burp
gun, the crack of the sniper's bullet.
On a day like any other day we heard the news that was flashed all
over the world. For a brief moment we were intoxicated with the
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joy of the thing of which we had so· long dreamed . And then we
remembered. We remembered Colmar and Leipheim and all the
rivers and the woods and the streams and the towns and the
men who lay between. We remembered another city and we
wondered what rivers and what woods and what streams and
what towns and what men lay between.
On June 15, 1945, just two years after our activation, we received
the word that the Regiment had completed its work; it was to go
back to the United States for deactivation. Most of us did not
have enough "points" for discharge, so we would be scattered
throughout other units in Germany.
Following this announcement was one which made· us all very
proud : we had been awarded the highest honor an organization
may receive, the Presidential Unit Citation. As long as we were in
the army, wherever we went, all of us would wear pinned on
our right breast, by itself, a royal blue ribbon rimmed with gold.
But many of us would carry forever, where it could never be removed, the pride of having built the 254th Infantry Regiment.

- 64 .

.:..::....:..----.~.

G ENERAL ORDERS
N o. 44
SECTION XIII

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 6 June 1945

2. As authorized by Ex ecutive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul. 22, 1943).
superseding Ex ecutive Order 9075 (sec . Ill , WD Bul. 11 , 1942, th e foll ow ing unit is cited by the War Department for outstanding performanc e
o f duty in action during the period indicated , under the provisions of
section IV , WD Circular 333, 1943, in the name of the President of the
United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction.
The citation reads as follows:
The 3d Infantry Division with the following attached units :
2541h Infantry Regiment,
99th Chemical Battalion ,
168\h Chemical Smoke Generator Company_
451st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion ,
661sl Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP).
756th Tank Battalion ,
IPW Team 183,.
Fighting incessantly, from 22 January to 6 February 1945, in heavy snow
storms, through enemy-infested mar~hes and. v:oo~s. a~d over a flat
plain crisscrossed by numerous small canals , rrngatron drtches , and unfordable streams terrain· ideally suited to the defense, breached the
German defense ' wall on the northern perimeter of the Colmar bridgehead and drove forward to isolate Colmar from the Rhine. Crossing the
Fecht River from Guemar , Alsace , by stealth during the late hours of
darkness of 22 January, the assault elements fought their way forward
against mounting resistance. Reaching the Ill River, a bridge was thrown
across but collapsed before a.rmor could pass to the support of two
Battalions of the 30th Infantry on the far side. Isolated and attack by
a full German Panzer Brigade, outnumbered and outgunned, these
valiant troops were forced back yard by yard. Wave after wave of
armor and infantry was hurled against them but despite hopeless odds
the regiment he ld tenaciously to its bridgehead. Driving forwa rd in
knee-deep snow . which masked acres of densely sown mines , the 3d
Infantry Division fought from house to house and street to street in
the fortress towns of the Alsatian plain. Under furious concentrations
of supporting fire , assault troops crossed the Colmar Canal in rubber
boats during the night of 29 January. Driving relentlessly forward , six
towns were captured withing 8 hours, 500 casualties inflicted on the
enemy . during the day, and large quantities of booty siezed . Slashing
through to the Rhone-Rhine Canal, the garrison at Colmar was cut off
a~~ !he fall of the city assured . Shifting the direction of the attack, the
drvrsron moved south between the Rhone-Rhine Canal and the Rhine
towar~ Neuf Brisa~h and the Brisach Bridge . Synchronizing the attack ,
the brrdge was se rzed and Neuf Brisach captured by crossing the protectrng moat and scalrng the medieval walls by ladder. In one of the
h?r~<;>st foug_ht and bloodiest campaigns of the war, the 3d Infantry
Drvrsron annrhrlaled three enemy divisions, partially destroyed three
others,. captured over 4,000 prisonners, and inflicted more than 7,500
casualtres on the enemy.
By order of the Secretary ·at War:
Official:
J. A. UL\0
Major General
The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff
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